During his first term, President Donald Trump brought the United States and North Korea to the brink of war—only to later embrace the dictator he once vilified. This paradox, many analysts argue, could hold the key to resolving the current standoff with Iran over its nuclear program.
In mid-2017, as North Korea accelerated its weapons tests and Washington responded with escalating rhetoric and military drills, fears of a catastrophic conflict surged. Trump famously threatened Pyongyang with “fire and fury like the world has never seen” at the United Nations General Assembly, labeling Kim Jong Un a “little rocket man” and a global menace. Yet within months, the president’s tone shifted dramatically. He held three summits with Kim, expressed admiration for the North Korean leader, and effectively downgraded the nuclear threat from one of the most dangerous regimes on earth.
No denuclearization agreement was ever reached. But the crisis de-escalated, and the question now is whether Trump might replicate that approach with Iran. The Islamic Republic has long been portrayed by U.S. officials as a fanatical sponsor of terrorism, bent on destroying Israel and destabilizing the Middle East. The 1979 hostage crisis, the Iran-Contra affair, and decades of proxy conflicts have cemented deep animosity. Trump himself withdrew from the Obama-era nuclear deal, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), in 2018, claiming it was a disaster.
Yet after a U.S. raid that Trump said “obliterated” Iran’s nuclear capability, the danger has resurfaced. Tehran’s enriched uranium stockpile continues to grow, and intelligence assessments suggest the regime is closer than ever to a weapon. Some in Washington now wonder whether Trump might pull a “Kim” with Iran’s Supreme Leader—if not falling in love, then at least reaching a pragmatic understanding.
The parallels are striking. In both cases, Trump began with maximalist threats and military posturing, only to pivot to personal diplomacy. With North Korea, the shift was facilitated by South Korea and produced a historic summit in Singapore in June 2018. Though talks ultimately collapsed, they ended the immediate crisis. A similar path with Iran could involve Gulf mediators, European allies, and even the framework of the Abraham Accords, which normalized relations between Israel and several Arab states.
However, obstacles abound. Iran’s leadership has shown little appetite for direct talks with a president who has repeatedly called for regime change. And Trump’s recent declaration that he “calls all the shots” regarding Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has complicated any potential negotiation, particularly if Netanyahu loses reelection. As one analyst noted, “The irony is that whatever comes next may not be as binding as the JCPOA.”
Still, former officials and strategists point to Winston Churchill’s maxim: “Jaw, jaw, not war, war.” In a region where miscalculation could ignite a broader conflict, the Trump administration’s willingness to engage its adversaries—even those it once demonized—may prove more pragmatic than it appears. Whether that pragmatism extends to Iran remains the defining question of Trump’s second-term foreign policy.
As the world watches, the G7 summit approaches, where allies are bracing for clashes over Iran, trade, and defense. Meanwhile, Democratic lawmakers have blasted Trump’s Iran deal as worse than Obama’s, and doubts persist about a 60-day window for talks. The path to resolution remains uncertain, but Trump’s North Korea paradox suggests that even the most bitter enemies can become negotiating partners.
