The rapid expansion of BRICS from a five-nation investment label to an 11-member bloc representing nearly half of humanity is one of the defining geopolitical shifts of the century. But as the group’s latest summit in New Delhi made clear, its members are far from united on how—or even whether—to dismantle the U.S.-led order they all criticize.
The summit produced a 140-point declaration, a feat of consensus diplomacy given the rivalries among members. India, which hosted the gathering, managed to bridge differences by anchoring the text in established U.N. principles and standard multilateral language. But the declaration also masked a central paradox: while all members agree the international system is skewed against them, they have starkly different visions for change.
Two Camps Emerge
On one side, India and Brazil advocate for reforming institutions like the U.N. Security Council, the IMF, and the World Bank to give developing nations a greater voice. They want BRICS to remain non-Western but not anti-Western. On the other, China and Russia are more interested in building parallel structures that bypass Western-led frameworks altogether.
Meanwhile, newer members like Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Egypt maintain close security ties with Washington—even hosting U.S. military bases—while using BRICS to diversify their geopolitical options. For them, the bloc is a hedge against U.S. policy unpredictability, not a vehicle for confrontation.
Double Standards on Coercion
The New Delhi Declaration strongly condemned “unilateral coercive measures,” a phrase aimed at U.S. sanctions and the EU’s carbon border tax. That criticism resonates across the Global South, where many view such measures as tools of Western dominance. But the declaration conspicuously ignored China’s growing use of export controls on rare earths, critical minerals, and industrial equipment as leverage—including against its own BRICS partners.
Beijing has recently imposed informal export curbs on India, widely seen as an attempt to slow its emergence as a rival manufacturing hub. If unilateral coercion is objectionable when practiced by Washington, critics ask, why is it acceptable when practiced by Beijing? The answer lies in the mechanics of consensus diplomacy: every BRICS declaration needs unanimous approval, so members can jointly criticize external powers but cannot name coercion within their own ranks.
United by Opposition, Not Vision
This exposes an uncomfortable truth: BRICS is often united more by what it opposes than by what it practices or hopes to build. The bloc has succeeded in signaling that the era of Western dominance is ending, and more than three dozen countries—including U.S. allies like Bahrain and Turkey—have expressed interest in joining. But that attraction is driven less by a shared blueprint for a new order than by a desire for multiple centers of influence.
For Washington, the lesson is clear: dismissing BRICS as a talking shop is a mistake. The group’s growing appeal reflects a legitimate demand for greater representation in global institutions. As the bloc’s initiatives—from local currency settlements to its New Development Bank—gain traction, the U.S. would be wise to engage rather than ignore. The alternative is a world where the rules are written by those who no longer feel bound by them.
