Former Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman spent countless hours across the table from Iranian negotiators and reached a blunt conclusion: trust is not the currency of deals with adversaries. “I don’t think negotiations are ever about trust,” she told the author. But that insight, while sharp, misses half the equation. The United States doesn’t need Iran to trust it—but it desperately needs the trust of its own allies.
Dealing with an opponent like Iran boils down to two practical tools: verification mechanisms to monitor compliance, and credible incentives or penalties to shape behavior. Understanding what drives Tehran—its interests, its pain points—helps negotiators craft deals, and acknowledging some of its demands as legitimate can grease the wheels. But none of that requires personal trust. It’s intelligence work, not relationship-building.
With friends and partners, however, trust is a force multiplier. It breeds shared purpose, enables intelligence-sharing, and makes governments more willing to coordinate sanctions or military responses. That collective action, in turn, gives adversaries a powerful reason to comply. The bottom line: Washington doesn’t need to earn trust in Tehran—it needs to earn it in capitals from Riyadh to Berlin to Tokyo.
Iran’s recent blockade of the Strait of Hormuz has driven fertilizer prices up 40 percent, oil 50 percent, and Asian liquefied natural gas as much as 70 percent. President Trump can frame these spikes as predictable byproducts of U.S. policy, but for allies and partners who had no say in those decisions, the costs feel imposed, not shared. The anxiety is most acute in the Persian Gulf, where attacks on civilian infrastructure have rattled governments. While they have deep pockets for now, the threat to their long-term economic diversification plans is real.
Many Gulf states are tempted to accommodate Iran simply because it is a dangerous, permanent neighbor. Trust in the United States—as both a security guarantor and a diplomatic partner—has kept them aligned. But without sustained confidence, they may shift toward a hedging strategy that appeases Tehran and deepens ties with China. As the declining global perception of U.S. leadership shows, the window for rebuilding that trust is narrowing.
European governments have long played a middle role with Iran, but strains over tariffs, Ukraine, NATO, and Greenland are already fraying transatlantic bonds. Adding a new Iran crisis could push trust past the breaking point, making it harder to enforce consequences on Tehran. In Asia, countries like India—a major Iranian trade partner and a growing U.S. partner—are feeling the economic pain. China has stepped in, releasing oil and refined products to neighbors while painting Washington as a threat to global stability. Beijing’s outreach is not charity; it’s a calculated bid for influence, arguing that U.S. policy creates crises while Chinese renewable tech offers an escape from energy volatility.
So far, the Trump administration has focused on indirect talks with Iran rather than courting allies. A series of high-profile calls and meetings with partners—emphasizing that Washington understands their needs and prioritizes preventing a nuclear Iran—would go a long way. Broad participation mattered in the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, which included Russia, China, the UK, France, and Germany. That legitimacy gave the deal teeth Iran couldn’t ignore. A bilateral U.S.-Iran deal would lack that weight.
Iran’s strategy of patience bets that American unilateralism will fracture the coalition that makes U.S. pressure effective. That’s not an irrational wager. As the erosion of institutional trust at home mirrors the decline abroad, the administration’s zig-zagging approach to Iran risks deepening the damage. Rebuilding trust with Gulf partners, Europe, and Asia is not a diplomatic courtesy—it’s a strategic imperative. Sherman was right: you don’t need to trust an adversary to negotiate. But to win, you must win the trust of your friends.
Jon B. Alterman holds the Zbigniew Brzezinski Chair in Global Security and Geostrategy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
