Wars do not last forever, but how they end shapes global politics for decades. The U.S. learned this lesson after World War II, when early planning for occupation and reconstruction—the Marshall Plan—prevented a repeat of the punitive Versailles Treaty that fueled Nazi Germany. Today, with conflicts raging in Ukraine, escalating tensions with Iran, and the ever-present flashpoint of Taiwan, analysts argue that Washington must start planning endgames now.
Harlan Ullman, a senior adviser at the Atlantic Council and co-author of the doctrine of shock and awe, lays out three possible outcomes for each conflict: one side prevails, a stalemate leads to an armistice like Korea's, or fighting simply pauses as both sides regroup. History, he notes, has not favored external aggressors in recent decades—from Vietnam to Afghanistan to Iraq. Superior military power alone has not guaranteed victory.
In Ukraine, both Kyiv and Moscow are bleeding. Russian casualties far exceed Ukraine's, but Russia's population and landmass are four times larger. The ground war has devastated Ukrainian infrastructure, while Ukrainian drone and missile strikes deep into Russia exact a toll. Barring a radical leadership change or a Russian nuclear escalation, Ullman sees a Korea-like ceasefire as the most plausible outcome. That would leave the West supporting Ukraine to deter future Russian aggression, while a Trump administration, driven by America First policies, might disengage from NATO, forcing Europe to defend itself—a dangerous prospect.
Iran presents a different calculus. President Trump, who previously met with North Korea's Kim Jong Un, could surprise by engaging Tehran directly. But with rising oil and food prices fueling economic headwinds, a prolonged war seems unlikely. Another Korea-type settlement, leaving many questions unanswered, is possible.
Taiwan offers the most intriguing scenario. If the Kuomintang returns to power and agrees to some form of integration with China, U.S. policy—based on defending the island—would face a fundamental reorientation. Hardliners warn that a unified Taiwan under Beijing's orbit would embolden China to challenge U.S. global leadership and the dollar's reserve currency status, requiring an even stronger American military. Whether Asian allies would back such a buildup is uncertain.
Ullman's analysis is deliberately imperfect, but his core message is urgent: thinking must begin now. The worst outcome, he writes, is failing to anticipate these events, regardless of how they turn out. As Putin claims the Ukraine conflict is nearing resolution and Taiwan remains wary of U.S.-China talks, the need for strategic foresight has never been greater.
