The Trump administration has reportedly approved a 30-year civil nuclear agreement with Saudi Arabia that omits the long-standing "gold standard" restrictions barring enrichment and reprocessing—capabilities that could pave the way to a nuclear weapon. The move, first reported this week, has drawn sharp criticism from lawmakers and arms control advocates who note the irony of an administration that waged war against Iran over its enrichment program now potentially enabling Riyadh to pursue the same capability.
Sen. Ed Markey (D-Mass.) and colleagues have demanded the administration maintain strict nonproliferation conditions. Rep. Brad Sherman (D-Calif.) questioned why a president fighting to prevent Middle East proliferation would facilitate it for a lucrative contract. The deal's final terms remain unclear, but its timing could hardly be worse: the global architecture of nuclear restraint is crumbling.
In February, New START—the last remaining U.S.-Russia arms control treaty—expired after 15 years of legally binding limits on the world's two largest arsenals. Its verification mechanisms had largely ceased functioning in its final years, but its lapse leaves both nations without any caps on strategic forces for the first time in over half a century. Then, in May, the latest review conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) again failed to reach consensus, underscoring the erosion of the cornerstone of nonproliferation efforts.
At this precarious moment, Washington appears ready to launch another country down the nuclear path. "It's an irresponsible, reckless idea," said one senior adviser to the Arms Control Association, who spoke on condition of anonymity. "But it also makes me wonder: Where is the arms control advocacy community that's supposed to be raising the alarm?"
Some organizations are indeed engaged. The Arms Control Association, the Nuclear Threat Initiative, and the Federation of American Scientists continue to push for practical risk reduction. However, much of the broader abolition movement has gravitated toward the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), which has been signed by 95 countries and ratified by 74—but none of the nine nuclear-armed states have joined. Its moral appeal is undeniable, but its practical impact is limited, and critics argue it diverts energy from achievable steps.
Dr. Robert Dodge, a physician and former chair of the national executive committee of Physicians for Social Responsibility, recalled his 1983 trip to Leningrad with colleagues from the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War. "We all wished the world might one day eliminate nuclear weapons entirely, but we never considered that a practical road map," he said. Their mission then was to build public support for negotiated limits, testing restrictions, verification, and communication channels—efforts that made the world measurably safer.
Today's environment is equally dangerous. Russia and the U.S. are embroiled in conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East, with direct U.S.-Iran clashes. India and Pakistan nearly escalated last year, China is rapidly expanding its arsenal while pressuring Taiwan, and North Korea continues to advance its nuclear and missile programs. "Could there be a worse time for Washington to help launch a new nuclear-capable state in the most combustible region on earth?" asked Dodge.
Re-establishing binding arms control agreements should be the top priority, yet too much of the abolition movement remains fixated on the admirable but presently unattainable goal of total disarmament. Dodge expressed disappointment that Physicians for Social Responsibility and the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War have been distracted by abolition when no nuclear state would consider rolling back its arsenal. "No one is better positioned than doctors to explain the consequences of nuclear war," he said.
Urgent, attainable goals include restoring verifiable limits on U.S. and Russian arsenals, rebuilding inspections and transparency, preserving the global testing moratorium, strengthening military-to-military communication, keeping artificial intelligence out of nuclear command and launch decisions, and eventually bringing China into the framework. None of these guarantee a world free of nuclear weapons, but all would reduce the risk of catastrophe—a far more pressing need than chasing an unattainable ideal.
