In September 1943, the First Canadian Division mounted a bold assault on the Italian town of Potenza, a maneuver that helped British and American forces avert a potential rout and turn the tide of the Salerno campaign. Eighty-three years later, the question looms: could today's Canadian Army replicate that feat in a major combat operation alongside U.S. forces? As it stands, the answer is a resounding no.
The root cause is clear: since the Cold War's end, Canada's military has been tailored for what analysts call "contribution warfare"—deploying in multinational coalitions for peacekeeping and counterinsurgency, not large-scale, high-intensity conflict. That approach suited the unipolar era, but the strategic landscape has shifted. Canada's current army is no longer the force it needs to be—nor the one Washington expects from its northern ally.
Ottawa has unveiled a blueprint, Inflection Point 2025, to overhaul the army into a warfighting force capable of sustained combat against peer or near-peer adversaries. The plan is a positive step, but it remains just that—a plan. As Robbie Burns warned, the best-laid schemes often go awry, and Canada's ambitious vision may falter without substantial investment in recruitment, equipment, training, and sustainment.
The first hurdle is manpower. Inflection Point assumes the army will close a 3,000-soldier recruiting shortfall from last year and add 8,500 more regular personnel by 2040. But history suggests Canada has struggled to meet such targets. Recruitment, training, and retention remain persistent challenges, and there's little evidence these assumptions will hold.
Then comes procurement. A modern fighting force demands cutting-edge equipment, but Canada's acquisition system—even after recent reforms by the Carney government—is bogged down by political priorities like domestic job creation and diversifying away from U.S. suppliers. These goals often trump the urgent need to equip troops for contemporary battlefields, delaying delivery of essential gear.
Sustainment is another critical gap. Even if Canada solves procurement, it must build stockpiles and supply lines to keep a division in the field. The scale is daunting: as then-General Wayne Eyre told Parliament in 2023, at Ukraine War rates of expenditure, Canada would exhaust some key munitions "in days," with replenishment taking years. Replacing casualties at those rates would be equally overwhelming.
Finally, there's doctrine. The Canadian Army, like many NATO forces, has been slow to adopt the tactics, organizational structures, and command-and-control methods that the Ukraine conflict has shown are vital for survival. Without embracing these lessons, Inflection Point risks producing hollow formations, not the agile, lethal force envisioned.
For American readers, this may seem like Canada's internal affair. But as in World War II, Canada's ability to fight effectively abroad matters profoundly to U.S. interests. A future battle could hinge on a well-trained, properly equipped Canadian unit arriving at the decisive moment—just as at Potenza. Today, that capability is not assured. Let's hope we don't face another Salerno, but if we do, Canada must be past its inflection point, ready to repeat its historic success.
Andrew Latham is a professor of international relations at Macalester College and a senior fellow at the Institute for Peace and Diplomacy.
