Privately, many Republicans concede that Pete Hegseth is not suited to lead the Pentagon. But that does not mean House Democrats should move to impeach him when they assume the majority in January. Impeachment is a rarely used political tool for serious misconduct, and it seldom ends in a Senate conviction—especially when the effort is seen as purely partisan.
History is not on the Democrats' side. Only two Cabinet secretaries have ever faced impeachment. In 1876, William Belknap, President Grant's War secretary, resigned just before the House voted unanimously to impeach him. More recently, Republicans impeached Homeland Security Secretary Alejandro Mayorkas in 2024, only for the Senate to dismiss the charges without a trial. Three presidents—Andrew Johnson, Bill Clinton, and Donald Trump—were all impeached along partisan lines and acquitted in the Senate. Impeachment weakened Johnson, gave Clinton a temporary political boost, and did little to dent Trump's Republican support.
The math is daunting. To convict Hegseth, Democrats would need a two-thirds Senate majority, meaning at least 11 Republicans would have to break ranks—an outcome that looks virtually impossible. Impeachment would almost certainly fail to remove Hegseth or change administration policy, but it could hand Hegseth and Trump a propaganda victory, allowing them to claim vindication.
Two weeks ago, outgoing Rep. Thomas Massie (R-Ky.) introduced eight articles of impeachment against Hegseth, covering actions from unauthorized war against Iran to retaliation against Sen. Mark Kelly (D-Ariz.) for criticizing military policy. Every Democrat joined Massie in opposing a motion to refer the resolution to the Judiciary Committee, but the motion passed 211-204, shelving the matter for now. Several leading progressives, including Rep. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (D-N.Y.) and Rep. Ro Khanna (D-Calif.), have urged immediate action when Democrats take control. Khanna said, “No, we should just push it.”
Whether Hegseth's actions amount to “high crimes and misdemeanors” is debatable. The more pressing question for Democrats is political: How can they hold the administration accountable without derailing the cost-of-living agenda that voters expect them to pursue? Most voters are likely to view impeachment as an attack on Trump by proxy, and the effort could consume the early months of the new Congress, distracting from priorities like Medicare expansion and other legislative fights.
Democratic leaders, including likely Speaker Hakeem Jeffries (D-N.Y.), have voiced support for impeachment in principle but have not introduced their own resolution. Once they control the House, they will own the decision. They would be wise to send any impeachment resolution to committee, not to bury it, but to build a factual record through hearings and sworn testimony. That approach could expose Hegseth's alleged abuses—such as dismantling civilian casualty safeguards, censuring Kelly, mishandling classified information, and politicizing the officer corps—without the political risk of a snap vote.
Some of Massie's articles focus on Trump's decisions, including the war in Iran and military strikes in Yemen and the Caribbean. Executive branch legal opinions, however dubious, provide Hegseth cover. But other charges, like ordering attacks on survivors of boat strikes or his role in the February 28 bombing of a primary school that killed over 100 children, could be explored in hearings. Democrats might also attract bipartisan support for narrower accountability measures, such as restrictions on appropriations or censure.
The first test for Democratic leaders will be resisting pressure from their own caucus to move immediately. As Jeffries prepares to take the speakership, he must balance the demands of progressives with the political reality that impeachment could backfire. A measured approach—investigations first, then a decision—would serve both accountability and the party's broader goals.
