The United States is pushing ahead with a massive buildout of infrastructure to support artificial intelligence, advanced manufacturing, and the next wave of economic expansion. For the first time in years, electricity demand is climbing sharply, and utilities are racing to upgrade the grid. But two former leaders with deep experience in national security and energy warn that policymakers may be repeating a costly mistake: embedding vulnerabilities into the systems that will power the nation's future.
Jim Langevin, a former Democratic congressman from Rhode Island who helped create key federal cybersecurity institutions, and Tom Fanning, former chairman and CEO of Southern Company, argue in a new analysis that the rush to modernize risks overlooking a critical question. They write that the same pattern has played out before: cost and convenience take priority until dependence on foreign technology becomes a national security crisis.
The electric grid is becoming far more digital than most Americans realize, they note. New systems not only move electricity but also communicate with each other, process data, and manage power flows across entire regions in real time. These features improve efficiency but also create new points of vulnerability, especially when the software and control systems come from foreign suppliers with ties to adversaries.
Chinese government-linked hackers have already burrowed into U.S. critical infrastructure, including power systems, according to U.S. officials. These intrusions appear designed to give Beijing the ability to disrupt vital services during a future crisis. Langevin and Fanning pose a blunt question: If China is already trying to gain access from the outside, why make it easier by relying on Chinese-linked technology inside the grid's command centers?
Not every component poses the same risk, they acknowledge. A screw, a solar panel, or a battery cell—hardware that simply performs a function—presents a different challenge from the software, firmware, and control systems that act as the grid's brain. These systems can communicate remotely, receive updates, and influence how electricity flows across large parts of the country. They deserve the highest scrutiny.
The authors point to the costly lesson of Chinese telecommunications equipment. After years of allowing cheap devices into U.S. networks, the Federal Communications Commission estimated it would cost more than $5 billion to remove and replace them. The same dynamic is now playing out in the energy sector, they warn.
Washington cannot replace every foreign-made control system overnight, but failing to prioritize carries its own risks. A recent paper from two leading cyber research institutions recommends assessing technologies based on their systemic importance, impact, and digital sophistication—domestically sourcing the most critical while relying on global supplies for the least consequential.
The challenge requires a partnership between government and industry, the authors argue. Most critical infrastructure is privately owned, but companies cannot independently determine which technologies pose the greatest national security threats. Washington should provide clearer guidance and share threat information more aggressively. Industry, in turn, should use that data to make smarter sourcing decisions before vulnerable technologies become deeply embedded.
The decisions made today will shape energy security for decades. If policymakers focus on the technologies that matter most, they can modernize the grid while reducing risk. If not, the country may discover too late that it built avoidable vulnerabilities into one of its most important systems.
Most Americans rarely think about the electric grid because it just works. The authors conclude that leaders should do everything possible to keep it that way.
