As President Trump prepares for a reported visit to China, the focus in Washington will be on the signals coming out of the meeting. But a more uncomfortable question lingers: How much insight into China has the U.S. already lost?
The sharp decline in academic exchanges, business presence, and research collaboration with China has eroded a critical pipeline of firsthand knowledge. Fewer Americans are living and working in China, observing its rapid changes and feeding back a steady stream of real-time intelligence. That loss has real consequences for policy and competitiveness.
Late Discoveries, High Stakes
Consider the case of Ford CEO Jim Farley. After visiting China in 2024, he returned stunned by the speed and sophistication of the country's electric vehicle market, warning that Chinese automakers posed an existential threat to Ford. The surprise wasn't China's progress—it was that a top American executive seemed to be discovering it so late.
In the years before Farley's trip, I had learned a great deal about China's EV market by talking to cab drivers. They described lower prices, better battery performance, and the rapid pace of new models. These weren't industry insiders—they were everyday consumers. Taken together, those conversations painted a clear picture that had largely escaped U.S. boardrooms.
The U.S. is losing the sustained on-the-ground presence that once allowed policymakers and business leaders to understand what is happening in China. Not every individual observation is reliable, but in aggregate they reveal patterns. When fewer Americans are present, even widely visible developments register late. Distance is becoming a strategic liability.
Eroding Foundations
For decades, American understanding of China was grounded in lived experience. Students, researchers, and executives spent extended time there, learned the language, and built relationships that illuminated how China's systems actually function. That foundation is now crumbling.
U.S. student enrollment in China has fallen from roughly 15,000 at its peak to fewer than 2,000, according to the US-China Education Trust. Research collaboration is increasingly treated with suspicion, even in low-risk areas. Fewer business leaders spend extended time in the country. The pipeline of Americans with firsthand experience is thinning.
This shift has unfolded alongside a hardening Washington consensus: that earlier engagement was too optimistic and that China is a potential threat across nearly every domain. That perspective captures some truth but misses a more basic problem—the U.S. is becoming less able to understand China at all.
Policy Consequences of Blindness
That loss of ground-level insight has real policy consequences. China's economic strategy is often described in Washington as tightly coordinated and centrally directed. In reality, much of its dynamism comes from local competition and experimentation. In sectors such as electric vehicles, local governments compete to attract investment, offer subsidies, and shape markets in ways that don't always align with national plans. That complexity is difficult to see from afar.
Misjudging China's capabilities can delay responses in key industries. Misunderstanding its internal dynamics can lead to policies based on faulty assumptions about how it will behave under economic or geopolitical pressure. The risk of miscalculation grows.
The Path Forward
At a time when Washington prides itself on taking a tougher line on China, the U.S. is eroding the broader ecosystem of knowledge and experience that allows it to interpret China in real time. High-level meetings and intelligence assessments are critical but cannot substitute for a broad base of people on the ground observing how policies are implemented, how markets evolve, and how society is changing.
Reversing this trend does not mean ignoring real risks. It means distinguishing between targeted caution and broad disengagement. Limiting certain forms of cooperation may be necessary, but reducing the number of Americans who can see and interpret China firsthand comes at a cost. As Senator Bernie Sanders has argued, cooperation in areas like AI can serve U.S. interests—but only if Washington has the insight to negotiate from strength.
Expertise on China does not develop quickly. It requires time, language skills, and sustained exposure. The U.S. does not need to agree with China to understand it. But it does need broad, real-time awareness to compete effectively. Without it, even the most carefully managed relationship risks being built on guesswork rather than insight.
Daniel Murphy is executive director of the Mossavar-Rahmani Center for Business and Government at Harvard Kennedy School. He has spent more than two decades working on U.S.-China relations, including extended time living and working in China.
