The Horn of Africa, already a patchwork of rivalries and proxy conflicts, is emerging as a potential flashpoint for a direct confrontation between two of Washington's key allies: Israel and Turkey. With overlapping disputes in Syria and a growing competition for influence in the region, the risk of an armed clash is real, and the Trump administration may need to add this to its mediation agenda.
As historian Simon Sebag-Montefiore has noted, the current scramble for Africa is no longer led by European powers but by Middle Eastern and African states. The Horn is a cauldron of competing interests, involving Somalia, Somaliland, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Israel, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia. The stakes are high, and any miscalculation could trigger a conflict that draws in outside powers.
Djibouti, strategically located on the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, hosts military bases from the United States, China, France, Japan, and Italy—all paying significant fees for the privilege. The U.S. operates Camp Lemonnier, its main African base, which serves as the headquarters for the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa. China is expanding its support base, France maintains about 1,500 troops, Japan has its only overseas base there, and Italy runs a support facility.
Beyond Djibouti, Turkey has its largest overseas military base in Somalia, providing support since 2011. Israel, the only country to recognize Somaliland's breakaway state, reportedly operates from its territory against Houthi rebels in Yemen. Somaliland is seeking Israeli air defense systems to counter what it sees as a Turkish drone buildup in Somalia. The United Arab Emirates, though not formally recognizing Somaliland, has backed it for decades and operates the port at Berbera, expanding its air and naval presence.
The rivalry between Israel and Turkey is most acute in the Horn, where they back opposing sides. Turkey supports Somalia's central government, while Israel and the UAE lean toward Somaliland. Last month, Somaliland's president accused Turkey of lobbying against its recognition. Meanwhile, Turkey has blocked an agreement that would have given landlocked Ethiopia access to the Red Sea via Somaliland, a move that has heightened tensions with Eritrea, which fears Ethiopia might try to seize access by force.
Both Israel and Turkey have military presences in Syria, where they are also at odds. Israel has struck Syrian airbases, drawing Turkish condemnation. A confrontation in the Horn could spill over into Syria, potentially destabilizing the country and creating openings for Russian or Iranian influence—a scenario that runs counter to U.S. interests.
The Trump administration has been trying, without success, to establish a deconfliction mechanism between Israel, Turkey, and Syria. Extending similar efforts to the Horn of Africa could help reduce tensions before they escalate into open hostilities. Both Israel and Turkey are close U.S. allies—Israel is a non-NATO ally, and Turkey is a NATO member—so Washington has both leverage and a responsibility to mediate.
As Dov Zakheim, a former Pentagon official, argues, Washington should make every effort to mitigate, if not reconcile, the two rivals on the Horn of Africa, just as it is attempting in Syria. The current war of words could quickly turn into real conflict, with consequences far beyond the region.
